About . . . . . . Classes . . . . . . Books . . . . . . Vita . . . . . . . Links. . . . . . Blog

by Peter Moskos

October 15, 2017

Cops in Conservative Cities Shoot & Kill More Often

Forbes came out with a list of the 10 most conservative and liberal cities in America.

Top ten conservative, in rank order:
Mesa
Oklahoma City
Virginia beach
colorado springs
Jacksonville
Arlington, TX
Anaheim
Omaha
Tulsa
Aurora
Top ten liberal, in rank order:
San Fran
DC
Seattle
Oakland
Boston
Minneapolis
Detroit
NYC
Buffalo
Baltimore
I'm not going to argue with the rankings. I don't really care. But here's what I thought: I bet police shoot a lot more people in the conservative cities. Related to and perhaps correlated with the fact police shoot more people, per capita, in states that are more white.

How's this for a working hypothesis? Other things being constant (they rarely are), police shoot more people when nobody cares about police-involved shootings. And white people -- particularly conservative white people -- don't really care about police-involved shootings. Period. No matter the race of those shot. And when there's never any pushback or criticism of police, laws and training and culture do not change.

Based on Washington Post data from January 2014 through September 2016, the annual rate (per 100,000) of police-involved homicides in the top 10 conservatives cities (n = 82) is 0.61. The annual rate of police-involved homicide in the top 10 liberal cities (n=78) is 0.20.

Now New York City accounts for a lot of that, in terms of population. But even were one to remove NYC for simply being too big, the rate in the liberal cities is 0.39, or 64 percent of the conservative city average. Even without New York, cops in the most liberal cities are more than a third less likely to shoot and kill people. Are other factors involved? Sure. And they might be correlated to political ideology. Go figure them out, if you wish.

Also of note, and I'm just looking at 2016 murder numbers, the murder rate in the top ten liberal cities in 9.96, which isn't that much higher than the homicide rate of 8.01 in the top 10 conservative cities. If you take NYC out of the equation, the homicide rate for the other 9 liberal cities goes way up to 20. But if you consider that murder is higher in the top-10 liberal cities, the lower rate of police-involved homicides is all the more impressive.

I mean, think of it this way: community violence and police-involved violence are very related. A lot of the people police shoot are violent criminals with guns, some in the process of using them. The more violent criminals there are running around shooting people, the more people police will shoot. Always has been, always will.

That said....

There were 138 murders in DC last year and every year (for the past 2.75 years) police shoot and kill 4 people. In Tulsa and Oklahoma City (which combined have 1 million people) there were 142 murdered last year and police shoot and kill 10 people. That's a big difference. Police do shoot a lot more people out west. And it's not just in conservative cities. In fact, given the low levels of murder in Seattle and San Francisco, the high number of people killed by police stand out.

Anaheim had but 7 murders last year and police shot and killed 5 people since 2015. In Boston, Arlington and Detroit, police also shot and killed 5 people in the past 2.75 years, but there were 49, 21, and 303 murders, respectively, in these cities. Why? My guess: a combination of cops being better trained, less afraid, and less trigger happy in these cities combined with cops also being less proactive.


Here's the raw data I used. (Rate modifier is used in column G, (population/100,000)/2.75, because I'm using 2.75 years of police-involved homicide data.)


October 9, 2017

Quality Policing Podcast

Nick Selby and I have a new episode over at qualitypolicing.com. Among other things, we manage to have a rational debate about gun control. Imagine that.

It's Episode Five. (And yet somehow, from two people who claim to be good with numbers, we now have ten episodes.)

Two-year homicide increase in cities

Now that the UCR data for last year is out, here is the homicide rate increase in cities over 400,000 people. This is two year, 2014-2016.

Homicide is up in 40 of the 48 largest cities.

September 20, 2017

St. Louis and the acquital of Officer Stockley

So somehow perhaps I thought doing a podcast would be less time consuming or easier than writing a blog post? No. Hell, no. Do you know what editing entails? Even light audio editing? But it's different. Kind of fun. What the hell. I hope it's educational (and hopefully also entertaining).

Anyway, here's Nick Selby and I talking about the acquittal of Officer Stockley in St. Louis.

We now have six episodes up. (Even though with our odd counting system it only counts as three.) And Nick finally got a decent mic (not till be heard till the seventh episode).

The episode we're most proud of is our interview of former Decatur Police Officer Andrew Wittmer. He talks about his police-involved shooting and the post-incident PTSD.

September 11, 2017

Quality Policing: Episode 2

Enjoy. You can add Quality Policing to your podcast subscription or download the MP3 audio file old-school style. Either way, head on over to the webpage for info and links.

September 8, 2017

Still trying to explain...

What's wrong with the Brennan Center's analysis? There are many problems. But here are a few:

1) They take a non-random sample (which isn't bad in and of itself) and then A) don't tell the reader in the text and B) state conclusions as if the sample were a random sample (every data point equal chance of being picked), representative of the nation.

2) They take short time frames (1 year) to point out that fluctuations could be random. True. For a short time frame. They could take a longer time frames (3 years) and see more clearly developed patterns.

3) This is bit trickier to explain. And that's why I'm giving it another shot. They base their findings on a magnitude of changes within their sample. This has the perverse effect of attention getting conclusions -- "more than half" -- that are noteworthy only in direct proportion to the limitations of their sample.

Let's take an analogy. I want to look at murder in my City of Moskopolis (a fine city, despite a bit of a crime problem). So I take a sample of three police districts (out of ten equally sized police districts). Now it just so happens that we already know that murder in Moskopolis is up 20 percent. But our study looks at District #1, where murder is up 30 percent, and District #2, where murder is up 10 percent.

Now maybe District #1 is important for its own reasons. "Murder is up 30 percent in District #1." No problem there. Or maybe, as mayor of Moskopolis, I prefer to give a bit of spin: "Murder is up 30 percent in District #1, but not so much in rest of city." That's fine, too.

But I can't say this: "District #1 accounts for 75 percent of the murder increase in Moskopolis." This is not true. It is false. District #1 accounts for 15 percent of the city's murder increase.



But some guy who has a stick up his ass about accurate data (even though he really does have better things to be doing with his time) gets all huffy and points out this inconvenient truth to the Washington Post, which quoted my incorrect statement because I'm generally a trustworthy guy.

So the Washington Post calls me and says "What's up?"

"Oh," I say. "I'm sorry. I was talking about 75 percent in my sample. Did I not make that clear?"

The Washington Post dutifully makes the correction and updates the story: "District #1 accounted for 75 percent of the murder increase in two districts."

This is now no longer a false statement, but it's a still meaningless one. Who cares about what percentage of change there is in one district in my sample? Why are we talking about two districts when we could be talking about six, eight, or even all ten of them. And here's a doozy: What if murder went down in District 2? Could District #1 account for more than 100 percent of the increase in my sample? Mathematically, yes, says my calculator. But statistically an increase of 100 percent is absurd. Methodologically, this should be a big red flag.

Anyway, Moskopolis is still a fine place. And indeed, we shouldn't overreact to an increase a murder. But if the mayor says murder isn't up, perhaps you shouldn't believe the mayor.

September 7, 2017

Quality Policing Podcast: Interview With Jeff Asher

There's another quality policing podcast in which I talk to data analyst Jeff Asher about the Brennan Center's latest report on crime. Asher had posted this thread about methodological problems in their data and analysis.
Brennan has a new report out showing murder down 2.5% nationally, but there are some major issues with that finding.

1) The figures cited aren't year-to-date, they're projected year end numbers based on around midyear counts.

2) Murder tends to pick up over the second half of the year, and any projection using midyear numbers will almost certainly be wrong.

3) They found murder -2.5% but included San Fran's 2016 count in that. There was no count for 2017. Removing SF makes murder -1.5%.

4) Detroit is estimated to be -27%, but that's based on Detroit's open data site.

5) That's problematic because the open data site is slow to add murders, so any year-to-date count will be wrong.

6) Detroit had over 130 murders as of late June according to the Detroit Police Department, and the 220 murders they project would be the fewest there since 1966.

7) Taking Detroit's inaccurate count out takes murder in their sample from -1.5% to +0.7% overall. So Detroit's inaccuracy explains the drop

8) The Phoenix count is similarly wrong. Phoenix had about 150 murders in 2016 but this report says they had 80 and project 60 for 2017.

9) The Phoenix figure was reached by using MCCA midyear data and doubling it, but Phoenix only reported Q1 data to the MCCA.

10) As of May Phoenix had 58 murders year-to-date in 2017 and 56 in 2016. Take away Phoenix and Detroit and suddenly murder is up 1.2% in the sample.

11) Which is to say nothing of the methodological issue of projecting midyear for 30 cities to a full year and calling it a national trend.

12) For what it's worth, my midyear piece for @FiveThirtyEight shows murder up a few % but rising slower than previous years.

13) Also worth reading is @Jerry_Ratcliffe on why doing year-to-date analysis isn't a great idea

14) Larger point is that measuring murder nationally is tough, drawing sweeping conclusions from badly incomplete data is a huge mistake in my opinion
This isn't the first time the Brennan Center has released faulty and misleading reports on the rise in homicide. In July, after the last one, I finally made an attempt to talk to one of the report's authors. Once I laid out my concerns, the correspondence ended. Today I asked the other author (via twitter) if he wished to be interviewed or engage in a civil discussion of methods. No dice, apparently he's "alright, thanks." It's still an open invitation.

There are numerous problems with their analysis, but the most irksome to me is the straight-up misleading statement. I asked:
Is this statement [from your report] true? "Notably, 55.6% of murder increase 2014 to 2017 is attributable to two cities — Chicago and Baltimore."
Because I know it's not true, since about 14 percent of the murder increase from 2014 to 2017 is attributable to Chicago and Baltimore. He replied:
Yes. It's true for the 30 largest cities (our cohort), not nationally.
This not an explanation as much as a confession because they don't say "for the 30 largest cities (our cohort), not nationally" in their report.



I understand how they got their numbers; on my calculator, I can replicate their methods. That's good, but not good enough. Their methods are faulty.

Here are some of my remaining unanswered questions I posted on twitter.
Since 2013, what is the change in homicides in those 30 cities? I get a decrease in 3 cities and an increase in 27. Is this correct?

Do you understand problems in saying a "percentage of increase in sample"? Substantively meaningless & statistically absurd.

If you have three years of data, why do 2017 tables only compare with last year, 2016?

It may turn out to be true, but still seems a odd choice that only mention of (20%!) 2-year homicide increase is as "short-term fluctuation"

If twitter can't do this justice, I'd be happy to interview you for @QualityPolicing podcast.
I asked if we could "continue w/ a civil discussion of your methods?" Alas, the reply was: "I'm alright, thanks."

For two main reasons, I'm not OK. I'd like the Left to stay committed to the truth. The generally decent Brennan Center should be above Heritage-Foundation-style BS.

But more importantly: when you say murder is down when murder is up, it's not just an issue of truth. It's also an attempt to make the murder victims -- disproportionately poor young black men -- disappear from our consciousness. As if they never existed. Do their lives not matter, too?

September 5, 2017

Quality Policing Podcast

Nick Selby and I made a podcast! Check it out at qualitypolicing.com/. The first episode is up. And cut us some slack, it's the first episode.

September 4, 2017

The Freddie Gray Effect in Baltimore

Building on my previous post on data presentation, I did some grunt work to get a count of murders and shootings for each and every day since January 1, 2012. (If you think that's easy or [that] can be readily downloaded, you're wrong. Update: I could have saved a few hours of grunt work had I thought of using the  =VLOOKUP function in excel to fill in missing dates that had no major crimes.)

If you simply chart the data, you get this kind of chart, which might be cool in an abstract expressionist blurry kind of way, but it's next to worthless as a form of data presentation.



Here's the same data, given a bit of love and handling. For all the reasons mentioned in my previous post, I went back to a one-year moving average, split on April 27, 2015, the day of the Baltimore riots. (Pre-riot takes the average from preceding year; post-riot from the year following.) What I'm trying to highlight, in an honest way, is the large spike in murders and shooting immediately after the riots and Mosby's decision to bring flimsy criminal charges against six Baltimore City police officers.



Unlike other crimes, shootings and homicides are reported quite accurately. Other crimes will rise and fall in sync. (And if the data doesn't show that, consider those data flawed, particularly in terms of less accurate reporting.) And if you're more partial to a line graph:



The riots were a big deal, but nobody died. More important to policing and public safety was what happened after the riots. Nobody was holding the tiller. The department was basically leaderless. The mayor had been almost in hiding. Then Mosby made the biggest mistake of all. She criminal charged six officers for doing their job -- legally chasing and arresting a man running from an active drug corner (this man, Freddie Gray, then died in the police van and that led to riots). Mosby got no convictions because she had no case. She couldn't prove a crime, much less culpability. She would later say, "I think the message has been sent." Police got the message: if you do your job and somebody dies, you might face murder charges. Activists and Baltimore's leaders pushed a police-are-the-problem narrative.

Police were instructed -- both by city leaders and then in the odd DOJ report city leaders asked for -- to be less proactive since such policing will disproportionately affect minorities. Few seem to care that minorities are disproportionately affected by the rise in murder. Regardless, police were told to back off and end quality-of-life policing. So police did. But, unlike the arrest-'em-all strategy formulated by former Mayor O'Malley (which worked at reducing crime a little) discretionary enforcement of low-level offenses targeting high-risk offenders reduced violence a lot. It also sent a proper message to non-criminals that your block and your stoop were not going to be surrendered to the bad boys of the hood.

Of course these efforts will disproportionately affected blacks. In a city where more than 90 percent of the murderers and murder victims are black, effective anti-violence policing will disproportionately affected blacks (Of course, bad policing will, too). The rough edges of the square can be sanded down, but this is a square that cannot be circled. Reformers wanted an end to loitering and trespass arrests. Corner clearing basically came to a stop. Add to this other factors -- fewer police officers, the suspension of one-person patrol units, poor leadership -- and voilĂ : more violent criminals committing more violent crime.

Murders and shooting increased literally overnight, and dramatically so. Of course this took the police-are-the-problem crowd by surprise. By their calculations, police doing less, particularly in black neighborhoods, would result in less harm to blacks. And indeed, arrests went way down. So did stops. So did complaints against policing. Even police-involved shootings are down. Everything is down! Shame about the murders and robberies, though.

Initially this crime jump was denied. Now we're supposed to think it's just the new normal for a city in "transition." How about this narrative: police and policing matter; and despite all the flaws in policing at a systemic and individual level, police and policing are still more good than bad, especially for society's most at risk. There is no reason to believe that the path to better policing much pass through a Marxist-like stage of "progressive reform" before improving. We pay police, in part, to confront violent criminals in neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of all men are murdered. We own this to those, all of those, who live there. To abdicate police protection in the name of social justice in morally wrong.

And lest you think this rise in crime is only a problem in Baltimore, be aware that over the past three years, homicide is up dramatically in America, almost everywhere. Not just Baltimore and Chicago. Unprecedentedly so, in fact.


In related news, the odds of dying if shot in Baltimore have gone down slightly since 2012, presumably because of better medical care. It's a crude measure, but notice the downward slope of the trend line. The chance of dying has gone down from 39 percent to 34 percent. Also note the seasonal changes in mortality. I don't know why that is.


September 3, 2017

Data presentation and the crime rise in Baltimore

Data presentation fascinates me because it's both art and science. There's no right way to do it; it depends on both hard data, good intentions, and interpretive ability. Data can be manipulated and misinterpreted, both honestly and dishonestly. And any chart is potentially yet another step removed from whatever "truth" the hard data has.

Where I'm going isn't exactly technical, but there's no point here other than data presentation and honest graph making (and also crime being f*cking up in Baltimore after the riots, but that's not my main point). If that doesn't interest you, stop here. [Update: Or jump to the next post.]

I took reported robberies (all), aggravated assaults, homicides, and shootings from open data from 2012 to last month. I then took a simple count of how many happen per day (which is strangely not simple to simple to analyze, at least with my knowledge of SPSS and excel). You get this.



It takes a somewhat skilled eye to see what is going on. Also, since the day of riot is so high (120), the y axis is too large. With some rejiggering and simply letting that one day go off the scale unnoticed, you get this.



It's still messy, but is the kind of thing you might see on some horrible powerpoint. Things bounce up and down too much day-to-day. And there are too many individual data points. Nobody really cares that there were more than 60 one day in July 2016 and less than 5 in early 2016 (I'm guessing blizzard). It's true and accurate, but it's a bad chart because it does poor job of what it's supposed to do: present data. Again, a skilled eye might see there's a big rise in crime in 2015, but the chart certainly doesn't make it easy.

Here's crimes per day, with a two-week moving average. A moving average means that for, say September 7, you take Sep 1 through Sep 14 and divide by 14. Why take an average at all? Because it smooths out the chart in a good way. It's a little less accurate literally but much more accurate in terms of what you, the reader, can understand. One downside is that the number of crimes listed for September 7th isn't actually that number of major crimes that happened on that day. You can see why that might be a big deal in another context. But here it isn't.



For a general audience it's not clear what exactly the point is. You still have lots of little ups and downs, and the seasonal changes are an issue. (Crimes always go up in summer and down in winter. And it's not because of anything police do. And it's nothing do to with the non-fiction story I'm trying to tell.) On the plus side, you do see a big spike in late April, 2015, after the riots and the absurd criminal prosecution of innocent Baltimore cops. But it needs explaining.

Also, you need some buffer for the data. The bigger the average, the more of a buffer you need. But for this I think this is one perfectly fine way to present these data, at least for an academic crowd used to charts and tables.

Another tactic is to take the average for the past year. Jeff Asher on twitter over at 538.com does good work with NOLA crime and is a fan of this. It totally eliminates seasonal issues (that's huge) and gives you a smooth line of information (and that's nice).



You can see a drop in crime pre-riot (true) and a rise in crime post-riot (also true). That's important. Baltimore saw a drop in crime pre-2015 that wasn't seasonal. It was real. And the rise afterward is very real. But there are two problems with this approach: 1) you need a year of data before you get going and 2) everything is muted. What looks like a steady rise (the slope since 2015) is actually a huge rise. But it looks less severe than it is because it takes an average from the previous year. But that's not exactly true. Crime went up on April 27, 2015. And basically stayed up, with a slight increase over time.

Here's my problem. I want to show the rise in crime post-riot. But I want to do so honestly and without deception. But yes, for the purpose of this data presentation, I have a goal. (My previous attempts were pretty shitty.)

Also, you need at least a year of data before you can graph anything. That's a downside.

Here's my latest idea. If one is looking at a specific date at which something happened -- in this case the April 27, 2015 -- and trying to eliminate seasonal fluctuations, why not take the yearly average for the previous year before that time and the yearly average after that date for dates after that time? I think it's kosher, but I'm not certain.

Here's how that works out:



This shows the the increase that was real and immediate. And as minor point I like the white line on the day of the riot, which I got from removing April 27 from the data (because it was an outlier).

Now if I wanted to show the increase in more stark form, I would move the y axis to start at 20. But being the guy I am, I always like to have the y-axis cross the x-axis at 0. That said, if the numbers were higher and it helped the presentation of data, I have no problem with a y-axis starting at some arbitrary point.

Take into account that graphs are like maps. While very much based on truth, they exist to simplify and present selected data. I mean, you can have my data file, if you want it. But I do the grunt work so you don't have to. But of course my reputation as an academic depends on presenting the data honestly, even though there's always interpretation (e.g.: in the case of a map, the world, say scientists, isn't flat). The point, rather, is if the interpretation honest and/or does the distortion serve a useful purpose (In the case of the Mercator Projection it was sea navigation; captains didn't gave a shit about the comparative size of the landmass of Greenland and Africa.)

So taking an average smooths out the line of a chart, which is a small step removed from the "truth," but a good stop toward a better chart. It's not a bad approach. But it tends to mask quick changes in a slow slope, since each data point in the average for a lot of days. A change in slope in the graph actually indicates a rather large change in day-to-day crime. There are always pluses and minuses.


If you're still with me, here's what you get when just looking at murder. Keep in mind everything up to this point has been the same data on the same time frame. This is different. But homicides matter because, well, along with people being killed, it's gone up much more than reported crime.



[My data set for daily homicides (which is a file I keep up rather than from Baltimore Open Data) only goes back to January, 2015. So I don't have the daily homicide count pre-2015. 2014 is averaged the same for every day (0.5781). This makes the first part of the line (pre April 27, 2015) straighter than it should be. This matters, and I would do better for publication, but it doesn't change anything fundamentally, I would argue. At least not in the context of the greater change in homicide. Even this quick and imperfect methods gets the major point across honestly. ]

Update and spoiler alert: Here's a better version of that chart, from my next post.

August 29, 2017

The Consequences of Bad Leadership: the Baltimore Riots of 2015

Last post I talked about what didn't cause the 2015 riots in Baltimore. Well, what did? Macro theory too often assumes happenings and history are per-ordained, that leadership decisions don't have consequences, and that individuals have no free will. But what if the buses kept running? What if police continued to disperse crowds in the street instead of retreating? What if Gregory Lee Butler hadn't cut (or been able to cut) a fire hose outside the burning CVS? What if police had arrested him on the spot? These things matter. If they don't, I don't know why we bother to try at all.

The riots were not inevitable. Systemic problems matter, but they're a constant. As important as they are, poverty and segregation and drug addiction and broken families and violence are nothing new in Baltimore. And they certain were not worse in 2015 than they were in the preceding decade. Why on April 27, 2017 and not on April 25 or 26? Or why not in 2003, when police arrested 312 people a day, many for minor zero-tolerance bullshit reasons? By 2014, the arrest rate had dropped by two-thirds and violence was down. God did not ordain Baltimore would burn a week after the death of Freddie Gray. It didn't have to happen.

Bad leadership caused the Baltimore riot of April 27, 2015. Effective leadership and tactics can be the difference between a protest or even a violent disturbance and a riot. The latter happens not just because people are pissed off. People are always pissed off, sometimes for good reason. Now this is a weird point to make, but Freddie Gray wasn't the first guy to die in the back of a police van; sadly, since the city still hasn't procured safe transport vehicles, he probably won't be the last. Angry people are a necessary but insufficient cause of rioting. Poor decisions in planning, message, and tactics let a bad situation spiral out of control.

Bad leadership has consequences. If not, why seek good leadership? Actions and inaction matter. Only on April 26, 2015, for instance, did the mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, defended a "measured" police response to protests by saying: "We also gave those who wish to destroy space to do that as well." The riots started the next day.

At the time, in 2015, many said the mayor's words didn't matter. And also that she didn't mean what she said, which may be true, but those were the words she said and the words people repeated. Also, now it's 2017. Does anybody still believe that the words from a chief elected executive have no impact? That they can't incite violence?

But it took many more bad decisions before the riots started. Somebody (and oddly, we still don't know who) made horrible transit and crowd control decisions at Mondawmin Mall on April 27. School kids were stranded en masse because the transit system was stupidly shut down. Kids couldn't get home. It was bad, but the city still wasn't in riot mode.

Ultimately the riots started because when things got rough, and cops received orders to pull back. The fear at the top, the mayor and Commissioner Batts, was that was police would be criticized for over-reacting. (And truth be told, they probably would have been.) But good leadership is willing to face criticism.

This video shows where and when the riot started, at the corner or North and Pennsylvania Avenues. (And just a block from the aptly named Retreat St). The looting began at 4:37pm. A line of cops was present near the CVS at 4:41pm. Even after looting began, cops didn't act. For more than hour cops stood by while the store was set on fire. A fire hose was cut within steps of officers who followed orders and did not engage. Police didn’t move till 6pm, and even then it took 50 minutes to regain control of the corner. By then it was too late. "Hold the line," police officers were ordered, and they did. And while waiting for orders to act, the "Thin Blue Line" (that ever-trite but here apt clichĂ©) broke down, and the city burned out of control.

August 27, 2017

"A small price to pay"?

Last post I presented the depressing fact that at current level of violence, the chance for a man in Baltimore's Western District to live to age of 35 without being murdered is just 83 percent. Yes, more than 17 percent of black men in the Western District will be murdered unless Baltimore can get a grip on violence. It hasn't always been so bad.

Before the riots and failed "reform," there were about 217 murders a year in Baltimore (2010-2014). That's not great, mind you. Not at all. Police Commission Davis said:
They [celebrated] when they got to a certain artificial number of murders. As if 200 murders is acceptable for a city of 600,000 people.
You know, darn it, at some level he’s right. Two-hundred murders is not acceptable. But... but... the chutzpah. Last year 318 people were murdered in Baltimore. 344 were murdered in 2015. In 2011 murders dropped to 197, the first time in decades murders were below 200. And the current police commissioner has the nerve to disparage city leaders who took a brief celebratory lap? The nerve.

Right now, for Baltimore, 200 murders wouldn't just be "acceptable," it would be a dream. 229 people have been killed this year, and we’re not even out of August.

(Murders in 2011 vs 2015, Baltimore Sun, click to embiggen)

It's not just the violence, it's that Baltimore's leaders blame everybody but themselves.
[Baltimore State’s Attorney Marilyn] Mosby cited zero-tolerance policing as a "failed strategy" that continued in Baltimore long after it was formally disavowed by the city's leaders. "Those failed policies are what got us to the place we were at in the spring of 2015," she said, referring to the unrest.
Blame O'Malley? He left office ten years ago. Violence went up two years ago.

Davis says:
"There was a price to pay for" the drop below 200 homicides, a price "that manifested itself in April and May of 2015," Davis said, referring to the uprising following the death of Freddie Gray.
Really? So according Davis, years of oppressive policing led to riots. It could be true. (Though I'm shocked to hear Progressives float the idea that repressive policing reduced homicides.) Perhaps the yoke of police oppression led people to rise up righteous indignation?

Between 1994 and 2014, annual arrest numbers in Baltimore varied from a low of 39,654 to a high of 114,075. You think more than 100,000 arrests each year for four years in a row might spark a riot? Well, it didn't. That was 2002 to 2005. Murders went up slightly during those years, to 269. If 114,000 arrests didn’t start a riot, it’s hard to imagine fewer than 40,000 doing so. By 2011, arrests were down 50 percent.
1994 arrests: 77,545 -- 321 murders
1995
: 81,140 -- 325
1996
: 61,403 -- 331
1997
: 77,750 -- 312
1998
: 89,149 -- 313
1999
: 85,029 -- 205
2000
: 86,093 -- 261
2001
: 97,379 -- 256
2002
: 106,117 -- 253
2003
: 114,075 -- 271
2004
: 104,033 -- 278
2005
: 103,837 -- 269
2006
: 93,393 -- 276
2007
: 86,334 -- 282
2008
: 82,656 -- 234
2009
: 79,552 -- 238
2010
: 69,617 -- 224
2011
: 59,877 -- 197
2012
: 55,451 -- 217
2013
: 42,097 -- 235
2014
: 39,654 -- 211
2015
: 27,765 -- 344
2016
: 25,820 -- 318
Look at at 2007 to 2014, a Baltimore miracle happened! Arrests were cut in half while homicides went down 25 percent, from 282 to 211. This was hard work and good policing. Not perfect, mind you. Sometimes not even good. But better, incrementally, year by year.

Davis and Mosby are trying to rewrite history, pretending years of progress never happened. Now it's one thing to be pissed on and be told it's raining, but these two are pissing all over our feet and telling us we're better off with wet shoes.

Go ahead and fix long-term systemic problems. But while you're doing that, in the meantime, let's tell police what we want them to do with criminals today. Violence varies independently of poverty, racism, unemployment, segregation, an family breakdown, the so-called "root causes" of crime. These didn't change in 2015. Policing did. Discouraging proactive legal discretionary policing allowed violent criminals to be more violent. Telling cops not to make legal but discretionary low-level arrests on drug corners was a bad idea.

There's only so much decline a city can take. Baltimore's population is at a 100-year low. And the people leaving, hard-working non-criminal taxpayers, are sick of crime.

Mosby admits Baltimore "is kind of in transition right now." I'm afraid Baltimore is transitioning from a city with failures to a failed city.